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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 2017, after social media exploded with outrage surrounding the 
sexual harassment and assault allegations against media mogul Harvey 
Weinstein, hundreds of women came forward revealing personal stories 
of harassment in the workplace.1  The most prominent alleged culprits 
include NBC News anchor Matt Lauer, television host and journalist 
Charlie Rose, Senator Al Franken, comedian Louis C.K., and more.2  
This flood of accusations by so many women, many of whom remained 
silent for years, poses a grim question regarding the effectiveness of 
current anti-discrimination laws. 
Quite conceivably, the failure to adequately protect employees 
stems from the lack of protection provided by mandatory arbitration 
agreements.  Today, more than sixty million Americans have mandatory 
arbitration clauses in their employment contracts.3  These clauses are 
generally required as a condition of employment and keep legal 
proceedings between the employer and employee out of the public eye, 
often allowing the accused to stay in their job while pushing victims out.4 
Arbitration, generally, is less formal, less expensive, and less time 
consuming than a court proceeding, partially because it is run by an 
arbitrator, instead of a judge, who is not required to adhere strictly to the 
 
 * Marsha Levinson, B.A. University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D. Santa Clara 
University.  The research that went into this writing has been nothing less than eye-opening.  
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 1. Dan Corey, Sexual Misconduct: A Growing List, NBC NEWS (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/sexual-misconduct/weinstein-here-s-growing-list-men-
accused-sexual-misconduct-n816546. 
 2. Id. 
 3. ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECONOMIC POLICY INST., THE GROWING USE OF 
MANDATORY ARBITRATION (Sept. 27, 2017), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-
use-of-mandatory-arbitration/. 
 4. See infra Section IV.A. 
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law.5  It comes as no surprise then that throughout the last few decades, 
as the number of employment litigation suits increased, many employers 
have turned to mandatory arbitration agreements.6   
Now, much attention is being paid to the expanded use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in employment contracts as well as the 
attendant harms these clauses pose to employees.7  Some critique 
mandatory arbitration agreements for stripping employees of their 
substantive rights and call for their invalidation.8  In contrast, supporters 
of mandatory arbitration cite the expediency and simplicity of arbitration 
as outweighing the inadequacy of judicial review and discovery inherent 
in the process.9 
On its face, mandatory arbitration seems to insult public policy.  It 
deprives citizens of a judicial forum provided to them by law.10  
However, perhaps we should judge the validity of mandatory arbitration 
based on what is to be the best practice for a majority of people, rather 
than on facets of public policy.  In light of the overworked, underfunded, 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), and 
backlogged federal courts, both employers and employees may actually 
be better off with mandatory arbitration.  This result, however, depends 
on whether the mandatory arbitration system can offer due process 
guarantees and fair resolutions. 
This Note will argue for the continued use 
of arbitration agreements as long as certain safeguards are implemented 
to preserve individual civil rights.  Currently, most employees have 
limited access to the court system.11  Arbitration is a supplement to the 
court system that provides both employees and employers with a fast and 
 
 5. See generally THE DUNLOP COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-
MANAGEMENT RELATIONS: FINAL REPORT 49–51 (stating that arbitration should be more 
attractive to employers for dispute resolution because it is less costly and less formal than the 
courts), 
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/downloads/keyWorkplaceDocuments/DunlopCommission
FutureWorkerManagementFinalReport.pdf (last visited Oct. 5, 2018). 
 6. Elizabeth A. Roma, Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts 
and the Need for Meaningful Judicial Review, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 519, 
520 (2004). 
 7. See, e.g., Christine Hines, Righting a Financial Wrong, PUBLIC CITIZEN (Feb. 27, 
2014), http://www.citizen.org/documents/righting-a-financial-wrong-forced-arbitration-
report.pdf. 
 8. See Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme 
Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 643 (1996). 
 9. See Kristen Decker & William Krizner, The Fallacy of Duffield v. Robertson and 
Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch: The Continuing Viability of Mandatory Pre-Dispute Title VII 
Arbitration Agreements in the Post-Civil Rights Act of 1991 Era, J. DISP. RESOL. 141, 153 
(1998). 
 10. See Roma, supra note 6, at 520 (arguing that arbitration circumvents the traditional 
judicial process). 
 11. See Decker & Krizner, supra note 9. 
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relatively inexpensive alternative method of dispute resolution.12  If the 
entire mandatory arbitration system were to be abandoned, many claims 
would go unheard.  In order to safeguard civil rights, however, the 
current arbitration system must be modified.  Specifically, the 
procedures currently in place are ill-equipped to resolve disputes 
involving civil rights claims such as sexual harassment.  Therefore, this 
Note proposes the retention of mandatory arbitration but with specific 
reforms that must be enacted by Congress in order to be effective. 
Section II will provide a history of mandatory arbitration and 
summarize the common societal perceptions towards mandatory 
arbitration as well as recent efforts that attempt to address its perceived 
shortcomings.  This section will also discuss recent legislation regarding 
mandatory arbitration and sexual harassment in the workplace, and the 
“knowing and voluntary standard”13 for the fair enforcement of 
compulsory arbitration agreements. 
Section III will identify the issues analyzed in this Note and Section 
IV will then delve into the legal and sociological literature on mandatory 
arbitration and sexual harassment in the workplace in order to analyze 
why existing laws against sexual harassment fail to be preventative.  This 
analysis will also discuss the role of arbitration in perpetuating harassing 
work environments and will use Fox News as a case study, highlighting 
some approaches for rectifying the problem. 
Finally, this Note will suggest that a more regulated system of 
arbitration is needed, reformed to serve the needs of employees.  In order 
to resolve the uncertainty surrounding the use of mandatory arbitration, 
this Note proposes that Congress amend the Federal Arbitration Act to 
grant States some authority to regulate arbitration and discusses potential 
strategies for doing so. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The emergence of mandatory arbitration over the last few decades 
has changed our legal system considerably.14  While arbitration has 
historically been used as an alternative to litigation, in the past it was 
knowingly and voluntarily agreed upon, often by two or more businesses 
who had equal bargaining power.15  With the encouragement of the 
 
 12. See David Sherwyn et al., In Defense of Mandatory Arbitration of Employment 
Disputes: Saving the Baby, Tossing out the Bath Water, and Constructing a New Sink in the 
Process, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 73, 100 (1999) [hereinafter Sherwyn et al., Mandatory 
Arbitration] (“For employers, the reduced cost, increased speed, private nature, and 
elimination of juries make arbitration an attractive option.”). 
 13. See infra Section II.F. 
 14. See infra Section II.C. 
 15. Id. 
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United States Supreme Court, businesses jumped at the opportunity to 
mandate arbitration of future employment disputes rather than allow 
those disputes to be brought in court.16  Today, the involuntary 
imposition of arbitration in employment agreements has become a 
controversial topic.17   
A. What Are Mandatory Arbitration Agreements? 
Throughout the last few decades, mandatory arbitration clauses 
have become increasingly prevalent in employment contracts.18  A 
mandatory arbitration agreement, generally referred to as a pre-dispute 
arbitration agreement, is an agreement between an employer and 
employee to resolve future employment disputes by binding 
arbitration.19  Employers will include arbitration agreements as a 
condition of employment, tailoring agreements as they see fit.20  
Mandatory arbitration agreements can be inserted into employment 
contracts, employee handbooks, or stand-alone agreements.21  
Arbitration agreements can be broad, covering a variety of employment 
disputes, or can be more limited, covering only particular disputes.22  
Additionally, employers can either adopt rules for the arbitration 
proceeding from a neutral agency, such as the American Arbitration 
Association, or may formulate their own rules.23  Arbitration places total 
control of a dispute into the hands of a third party by allowing the 
arbitrator to render a binding decision on behalf of the parties.24 
B. What are the Benefits and Drawbacks of Mandatory Arbitration 
Agreements in the Employment Context? 
Scholars, judges, and legislators are in hot debate over the fairness 
of mandatory arbitration of statutory claims.25  Critics cite the “disparity 
of bargaining power between employers and employees, the involuntary 
 
 16. Id.   
 17. See infra Section II.B.ii. 
 18. See Colvin, supra note 3. 
 19. Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Arbitration of Employment Claims: A Practical Guide 
to Designing and Implementing Enforceable Agreements, 47 BAYLOR L. REV. 591, 594 
(1995). 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 594–95. 
 23. Id. at 595. 
 24. Robert J. Landry & Benjamin Hardy, Mandatory Pre-Employment Arbitration 
Agreements: The Scattering, Smothering and Covering of Employee Rights, 19 U. FLA. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 479, 483 (2008). 
 25. Marcela Noemi Siderman, Comment, Compulsory Arbitration Agreements Worth 
Saving: Reforming Arbitration to Accommodate Title VII Protections, 47 UCLA L. REV. 
1885, 1892 (2000). 
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nature of the arbitral process, the lack of judicial guidance and oversight, 
and the submersion of important public law matters into a private 
process” to rationalize why compulsory arbitration of statutory claims 
should not be enforced.26  In sum, critics fear that the process generates 
pro-employer outcomes at the expense of employees’ rights.  On the 
other hand, proponents of mandatory arbitration argue that efficiency 
and accessibility to a legal forum are critical benefits of this system.27  
Others make the point that effective arbitration allows more claims to be 
resolved before the employment relationship suffers irreversible harm.28  
Generally, supporters feel as if mandatory arbitration actually provides 
employees with a better chance at resolving their dispute.29 
1. Benefits of Mandatory Arbitration 
Advocates of mandatory arbitration see it as a protection against the 
“evils” of litigation.30  The virtues of mandatory arbitration parallel that 
of arbitration, generally.  In addition to being less expensive, arbitration 
offers a more informed, timely, and private resolution of the dispute than 
litigation.31  Particularly in an employment context, the less formal 
resolution of arbitration may be useful in preserving a positive 
employment relationship that may otherwise be harmed by lengthy 
litigation.32  Arguably, one of the greatest attributes of arbitration is the 
ability to select a decision maker with expertise in employment law 
matters.33  This allows for a more informed and predictable decision on 
 
 26. Donna Meredith Matthews, Note, Employment Law After Gilmer: Compulsory 
Arbitration of Statutory Antidiscrimination Rights, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 350 
(1997). 
 27. Eljer Mfg. v. Kowin Dev. Corp., 14 F.3d 1250, 1254 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[Arbitration] 
is a private system of justice offering benefits of reduced delay and expense.”). 
 28. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1893. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 UNLV L. REV. 
1631, 1638 (2005) (listing the “evils of litigation” as: publicity, jury awards, punitive 
damages, extensive discovery, and class actions) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory 
Arbitration]. 
 31. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 12. 
 32. See Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes in the Debate over 
Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 559, 564 
(2001) (arguing that “unlike litigation where resolutions often come too late and the process 
itself is so divisive that reinstatement is rarely practicable, arbitration holds out the promise 
of a prompt resolution more suitable for claims by incumbent employees or even former 
employees truly desiring reinstatement”). 
 33. See Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement 
of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 
449, 455 (1996). 
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the merits and, more importantly, a decision that both parties are likely 
to accept as legitimate.34 
For the court system, mandatory arbitration increases judicial 
efficiency by reducing the courts’ docket.35  Without arbitration, court 
dockets would become severely overloaded with claims that could each 
take several years to even reach trial.36 
Mandatory arbitration also presents benefits for employees.  For 
example, arbitration can be less intimidating than the court system,37 and 
arbitration of employment discrimination claims generally takes less 
than half the time it takes to litigate them.38  Additionally, because it is 
difficult for employees to retain competent legal counsel for routine or 
marginal cases,39 many employees may not be able to properly enforce 
their in court.40  As any law student will tell you, the rules of evidence 
within the courtroom are no joke—and certainly not something a lay 
person can quickly learn.  Arbitration, by contrast, provides a sure forum 
to have employees’ problems addressed by an informed neutral.41  
Additionally, the lower monetary cost of arbitration, coupled with its 
informal nature, allows some employees to bring claims that they 
otherwise would not have been able to bring in court.42 
 
 34. See Edward Brunet, The Core Values of Arbitration, in ARBITRATION LAW IN 
AMERICA: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT 3, 13 (Edward Brunet et al. eds., 2006) (“Trust of the 
expert arbitrator is essential to support the concept of finality.”). Cf. Mark C. Weidemaier, 
From Court-Surrogate to Regulatory Tool: Re-Framing the Empirical Study of Employment 
Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 843, 866 (2008) (suggesting that “[u]nlike judges, 
arbitrators can be selected for their sensitivity to local context, which might plausibly make 
them superior to courts at tailoring public norms to specific workplaces, not to mention better 
able to identify or create workplace-specific norms in areas not governed by external law”). 
 35. See Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985) (citing the House 
report developed at the enactment of the FAA stating “[i]t is practically appropriate that the 
action should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and 
delays of litigation.  These matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if 
arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Donna R. Milhouse, Agreements to Arbitrate: Facilitating Employment Dispute 
Resolution of Statutory Claims, 74 MICH. BUS. L.J. 1158, 1161 (1995). 
 38. See Richard A. Bales, A Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at 
Gilmer’s Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 343 (2006). 
 39. See Siderman, supra note 25, at 1894. 
 40. Id. at 1894–95. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration of Employee Discrimination Claims: 
Unmitigated Evil or Blessing in Disguise?, 15 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 1, 8 (1998); Susan A. 
Fitzgibbon, Teaching Unconscionability Through Agreements to Arbitrate Employment 
Claims, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1401, 1412 (2000) (concluding that “[b]ased on experience in 
labor arbitration, pro se representation may also be used more effectively and with fewer risks 
than in court because of the more informal nature of arbitration”); Robert A. Gorman, The 
Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of Public Law Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 
635, 651–52 (asserting that “the savings in time and expense that arbitration brings may allow 
an employee to pursue claims that he or she would otherwise be reluctant or unable to press”). 
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Finally, proponents weigh the drawback of not being able to bring 
a claim in court against the notion of not having the ability to arbitrate at 
all.  For employees who lack a mandatory arbitration agreement, 
voluntary arbitration becomes unlikely.43  It is unlikely that employers, 
knowing that an employee cannot bring a claim to court, will volunteer 
to arbitrate the same claim.44  If, however, employers are bound to 
arbitrate, any claim will be heard.45 
2. Three Major Critiques of Mandatory Arbitration 
Critics’ argument that mandatory arbitration is detrimental and 
unfair to individuals has many subparts; however, this Note will focus 
on three major critiques relating to the sexual-harassment-in-the-
workplace predicament.  The first concern regards the arguably 
nonconsensual nature of mandatory arbitration.  The second concern is 
that employers enjoy informational and bargaining advantages over 
employees, and in using these advantages, may impose an arbitration 
process that favors the employer even more.  And the final critique arises 
in the context of mandatory arbitration of statutory right claims such as 
Title VII discrimination. 
a. The Nonconsensual Nature of Pre-dispute Arbitration 
Agreements 
One major critique pertaining to mandatory arbitration is that the 
agreements are essentially nonconsensual because employees do not 
typically read or understand arbitration clauses, and even if they do, have 
no option but to sign them.46  This critique stems from the broader 
concern that employers often use their disproportionate bargaining 
powers to make employees sign arbitration agreements that grossly favor 
the employer.47 
 
 43. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1894. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. (citing RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND 
EXPERIMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 8 n.87 (1997)) (arguing that while 
compulsory arbitration prevents one percent of claimants who could get a lawyer to take their 
case from going to court, it opens up a forum for those claimants who would otherwise be 
shut out of the system because their claims are too small); see also Eric Schnapper, Advocates 
Deterred by Fee Issues, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 28, 1994, at C1. 
 46. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1649 (“even to the 
extent that consumers might read and understand an arbitration clause imposed on a predispute 
basis, psychologists have shown that predictable irrationality biases will prevent them from 
properly evaluating the costs and benefits of accepting such a clause.”). 
 47. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. § 2(3), (7) (2009) 
(asserting that “[m]ost consumers and employees have little or no meaningful option whether 
to submit their claims to arbitration . . . “and that “[m]any corporations add to their arbitration 
clauses unfair provisions that deliberately tilt the systems against individuals . . . . “). 
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Empirical studies show that only a miniscule percentage of adults 
read form agreements, and of these, an even smaller number understand 
what they read.48  Moreover, even if individuals read and understand 
mandatory arbitration clauses, employment contracts are offered on a 
“take it or leave it” basis.49  As a result, individuals who are limited in 
employment options have little choice but to sign such agreements.  In 
addition, people tend to be overly optimistic, and often under-predict the 
need they might have to bring a future claim and thus undervalue what 
they are losing by giving up the right to sue (i.e. the right to bring 
employment related claims to trial before a judge or jury).50   
Courts view arbitration clauses as legitimate because they see the 
clauses as a bargained-for element of a contract.51  Contracts are to be 
upheld when two parties voluntarily agree to be bound without undue 
influence or other unconscionable factors.52  However, more often than 
not, parties to mandatory arbitration contracts are not on equal footing—
for precisely the reasons described above.  In short, the typical employee 
lacks the knowledge or ability to make an informed decision with respect 
to such an agreement.53  The lack of understanding of what arbitration 
entails prohibits employees from properly consenting to the agreement.  
As a result of this nonconsensual nature of the contract, critics urge that 
mandatory arbitration is wrong as a matter of public policy.54 
b. Structural and Procedural Concerns 
A second major critique of mandatory arbitration agreements is that 
they may often be slanted in favor of the business.55  Instead of judges, 
arbitration cases are decided by arbitrators, hired by companies that 
routinely give them business.56  Critics argue that a “repeat provider” 
 
 48. See Alan M. White & Cathy L. Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 233 (2002) (analyzing literacy research which shows that a surprisingly high 
percentage of literate adults are unable to extract pertinent information from form contracts); 
Paul H. Haagen, New Wineskins for New Wine: The Need to Encourage Fairness in 
Mandatory Arbitration, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1039, 1059–60 (1998). 
 49. See Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Serv., 105 F.3d 1465, 1477 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding 
that many employees are not able to negotiate the terms of their employment contract). 
 50. See, e.g., Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, in 
BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS 13, 39 (2000); Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory 
Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1649. 
 51. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33 (1991) (noting that the 
legislative intent behind the FAA was to put arbitration agreements on the same level as other 
contracts). 
 52. See id. (expressing the importance of upholding contracts). 
 53. Haagen, supra note 48, at 1059. 
 54. See EEOC Notice Number 915.002, Section VII, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, (July 10, 1997), https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/mandarb.html 
[hereinafter EEOC Notice]. 
 55. See Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1649–50. 
 56. Id. 
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problem arises when companies give this repeat business to arbitrators.57  
Essentially, they fear that arbitrators may become biased toward the 
employer if the employer frequently uses their services.58  Although 
providers vehemently deny the charge that they are biased, critics 
maintain that, consciously or subconsciously, arbitrators may slant the 
result in companies’ favor in order to retain business.59 
Even if arbitrators are not biased, employers still have the 
advantage of being a “repeat player.”60  The idea here is that employees 
who participate in arbitration are hindered because (1) they lack 
information about arbitrators (such as experience and previous 
employment), and (2) they have less experience than employers who 
have likely participated in arbitration proceedings before.61 
Of course, while there exists extensive empirical data supporting 
the “repeat player” effect, some scholars have pointed out that the data 
is ultimately misleading because it includes a large proportion of claims 
by lower-paid employees who may choose the arbitral process even for 
frivolous claims, because it is often free.62  Other scholars argue that 
even if a repeat player effect does exist, litigation, too, provides such an 
effect for lawyers who represent employers and employees in court.  
However, because lawyers are more likely to take claims going to 
litigation (as opposed to arbitration) due to the potential for higher 
earnings,63 the scale of fairness is more balanced in litigation. 
c. Concerns Relating to Statutory Claims 
The final concern arises when mandatory arbitration is applied to 
Title VII and other statutory rights actions.  Mainly, critics of 
employment arbitration argue that it does not serve the policy goals of 
 
 57. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Alternative 
Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19, 35–37 (1999). 
 58. Yongdan Li, Applying the Doctrine of Unconscionability to Employment Arbitration 
Agreements, with Emphasis on Class Action/Arbitration Waivers, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 665, 
698–99 (2010). 
 59. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1650. 
 60. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead, 9 L. & SOC’Y REV. 
95, 97–104 (1974) (explicating typology of parties that divides litigants into “repeat players” 
and “one-shotters” and discussing each type of party’s incentives and advantages in legal 
system). 
 61. See Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. 
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 208–13 (1997) (reporting results of her study on employment 
arbitrations, in which employees win less frequently and win less of what they demanded 
when arbitrating against repeat-player employer as compared to when arbitrating against one-
shot employer); Russell Evans, Note, Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc.: Can 
Arbitration Clauses in Employment Contracts Survive a “Fairness” Analysis?, 50 HASTINGS 
L.J. 635, 644 (1999). 
 62. See Nancy A. Welsh, What Is “(Im)partial Enough” in a World of Embedded 
Neutrals, 30 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 495, 530 (2010). 
 63. Bingham, supra note 61, at 198–99. 
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anti-discrimination laws as well as a court proceeding would.64  
Opponents believe that arbitration proceedings evade public 
accountability, and that compared to public adjudication, arbitration is 
less effective at general deterrence and development of legal precedent.65 
The argument pertaining to accountability is that the private nature 
of mandatory arbitration prevents employees from holding their 
employers accountable to the public.  Employers are less likely to learn 
of an arbitration outcome that punishes another employer’s 
discrimination.66  When a matter is addressed by the court, however, 
other employers are exposed to the resulting consequences and are thus 
deterred from engaging in discrimination themselves.67   
A confidential forum also denies the public access to knowledge of 
harmful business practices, such as sexua harassment and 
discrimination.68  While arbitration often results in a private award, 
litigation of discrimination claims develops and refines legal precedent 
and educates the public about the legality of certain employment 
practices.69  This developed law not only governs future disputes, but 
also provides employers with guidelines for appropriate conduct and 
reinforces cultural norms that disavow invidious discrimination.70   
The lack of public accountability and transparency addressed here 
will be further explored in this Note, illuminating it as one factor that 
must be changed in order to make mandatory arbitration fairer for 
employees.71 
 
 64. Geraldine Szott Moohr, Arbitration and the Goals of Employment Discrimination 
Law, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 395, 396 (1999) (arguing that “arbitration is not an effective 
forum in which to satisfy the public goals of employment discrimination statutes, even when 
employees are accorded a fair hearing”). 
 65. Id. at 400, 437–38. 
 66. EEOC Policy Statement on Mandatory Arbitration, reprinted in 133 Daily Lab. Rep. 
(BNA) at V-A-1 (July 11, 1997) (arguing that arbitration’s private nature weakens general 
deterrence). 
 67. Id. at IV-C (July 11, 1997) (“By awarding damages, backpay, and injunctive relief 
as a matter of public record, the courts not only compensate victims of discrimination, but 
provide notice to the community, in a very tangible way, of the costs of discrimination.”). 
 68. See Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 995 F. Supp. 190, 197 
(finding that cases outside of the public forum allow fewer people to engage in dialogue on 
the issue); see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358–59 (1995) 
(stating that litigation reveals incidents of discrimination that may impact the entire industry). 
 69. EEOC Policy Statement, supra note 66, at IV-A (noting that “[a]bsent the role of the 
courts, there might be no discrimination claims today based on, for example, the adverse 
impact of neutral practices not justified by business necessity, . . .or sexual harassment . . . “); 
Moohr, supra note 64, at 432. 
 70. Moohr, supra note 64, at 400, 437–38 (“In articulating the standard of acceptable 
conduct, an adjudication reaffirms these values and forms community standards.”). 
 71. See infra Section IV.B.iii. 
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C. The Evolution of Mandatory Arbitration in the United States 
Voluntary binding arbitration has a long and mostly honorable 
history in the United States.72  Traditionally, businesses sought to resolve 
disputes through binding arbitration because of the expertise, speed, 
efficiency, privacy, and neutral decision makers that arbitration 
provided.73  Internationally, arbitration is favored because it allows 
businesses to feel secure against potential biases from another country’s 
courts and to obtain results that are more enforceable in another country 
than a court decree.74 Courts themselves have traditionally supported 
voluntary binding arbitration, enforcing both arbitral awards and post-
dispute agreements to arbitrate.75  However, pre-dispute agreements to 
arbitrate, i.e. mandatory arbitration clauses, have a more complex 
history, with courts originally refusing to enforce them.76  This of course 
changed with the passing of the Federal Arbitration Act.  However, until 
recently, these pre-dispute agreements were not used by businesses to 
require employees to resolve disputes.77 
1. The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 
In order to understand why mandatory arbitration became widely 
acceptable, one must understand how the Supreme Court interprets the 
Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA”).78  When Congress passed the FAA 
in 1925 it required courts to grant motions to compel arbitration pursuant 
to arbitration agreements.79  The FAA provides that “an agreement in 
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract… shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon 
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract.”80  Therefore, under the FAA, parties entering into an 
 
 72. William Catron Jones, Three Centuries of Commercial Arbitration in New York: A 
Brief Survey, WASH. U. L.Q. 193, 194 (1956) (examining uses of arbitration in New York, 
beginning with the Dutch West India Company in the 1600s, and concluding that “arbitration 
has been an important means of deciding disputes since the earliest days of European 
settlement in New York in the seventeenth century”). 
 73. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1635. 
 74. Id. (citing GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 7–11 (2d 
ed. 2001)).  Arbitration agreements are typically more enforceable in foreign countries than 
are court decrees because over one hundred countries have adopted the New York Convention 
requiring them to enforce arbitral awards issued by other signatory countries. 
 75. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1636. 
 76. See, e.g., Tobey v. Bristol, 23 F. Cas. 1313, 1319–23 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 
14,065) (refusing to use equitable powers to enforce pre-dispute agreement to arbitrate). 
 77. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1636. 
 78. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 
9 U.S.C. § 1-16 (2000)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (stressing that arbitration agreements entered into voluntarily 
will be upheld). 
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arbitration agreement are contractually bound to arbitrate any dispute 
that arises under said contract.81 
A series of Supreme Court decisions then expanded the FAA’s 
reach to cover almost all employment contracts, regardless of whether 
the parties actually had an opportunity to bargain or negotiate the 
terms.82  Since then, the number of arbitration agreements has increased 
exponentially. 
2. Supreme Court Jurisprudence Leading to the Emergence of 
Mandatory Arbitration 
Section 2 of the FAA states that “a written provision in . . . a 
contract evidencing a transaction . . . arising out of such contract . . . 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”83  In Moses 
H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction,84 the Court 
interpreted Section 2 of the FAA as Congress’ way of promoting a liberal 
federal policy favoring arbitration.85  The Court explained that because 
the FAA favors arbitration, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable 
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration.86  The practical impact 
of this decision is that whenever courts must decide whether a claim can 
be resolved through arbitration, the court’s decision will be slanted 
towards arbitration. 
The significant rise of mandatory arbitration agreements in 
employment contracts that followed Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital 
can be attributed to a line of United States Supreme Court cases that 
permitted the use of arbitration in situations that businesses had never 
previously thought acceptable.87  In the first significant case regarding 
mandatory arbitration in the employment context, Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver,88 the Supreme Court found that a compulsory arbitration clause 
in a collective bargaining agreement did not preclude a Title VII federal 
 
 81. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (emphasizing 
that a party making an agreement to arbitrate should be held to that decision). 
 82. See infra Section II.C.ii. 
 83. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1925). 
 84. 460 U.S. 1 (1983). 
 85. Id. at 24 (“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the 
contrary.  The effect of the section is to create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, 
applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.”). 
 86. Id. at 24–25. 
 87. See Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, Report, The Arbitration 
Epidemic: Mandatory Arbitration Deprives Workers and Consumers of their Rights, 
ECONOMIC POLICY INST. (Dec. 7, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-
epidemic/.   
 88. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
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claim.89  This meant that an employee had both a contractual right to 
submit a race discrimination grievance to arbitration and an independent 
statutory right to file a lawsuit under Title VII.90  This decision weakened 
the influence of mandatory arbitration clauses in reference to 
employment contracts, but only temporarily.91 
In 1991, the Court’s attitude toward arbitration had changed, as 
evidenced by its holding in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.92 In 
Gilmer, the Court held that individual statutory claims brought under the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“AEDA”) may be subject to 
valid pre-dispute arbitration agreements.93  In rejecting the plaintiff’s 
argument that arbitration of age discrimination was inconsistent with the 
ADEA’s purpose, the Court explained that an agreement to arbitrate an 
ADEA claim is not a waiver of substantive rights, but merely an 
agreement to resolve claims arising from those rights “in an arbitral, 
rather than a judicial, forum.”94  The Court reasoned that “so long as the 
prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause 
of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its 
remedial and deterrent function.”95  This idea was subsequently applied 
by lower courts to hold that claims arising under Title VII may also be 
the subject of pre-dispute arbitration agreements.96 
Gilmer also held that the FAA manifests a “liberal federal policy 
favoring arbitration agreements,” and preempts state statutes that 
conflict with this approach.97  Thereby effectively making the FAA the 
 
 89. Id. at 48–49 (inferring that Title VII supplements, rather than supplants, existing laws 
relating to employment discrimination). 
 90. Id. at 49–50 (the Court reasoned that although arbitration is efficient and inexpensive 
the informal proceedings were not the correct forum for deciding statutory claims); Title VII 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal law that prohibits sexual harassment. 29 U.S.C. § 
2000e-2. Under Title VII, harassment based on race, color, sex, national origin, or religion 
constitutes discrimination. Id. 
 91. Although the Court today recognizes arbitration as an appropriate forum for 
adjudicating an individual’s statutory claim, it has not expressly overruled Gardner-Denver; 
in later decisions the Court has found arbitration appropriate, as it provides a neutral forum 
for dispute resolution, so long as individual substantive rights are protected. See Roma, supra 
note 6, at 525. 
 92. 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
 93. Id. at 35. Gilmer argued that requiring arbitration of employment discrimination 
claims would be inconsistent with public policy and undermine the role of the EEOC, but the 
Court rejected both arguments. Id. at 26–29. 
 94. Id. at 26. 
 95. Id. at 28. 
 96. See, e.g., EEOC v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, 345 F.3d 742, 749–50 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (en banc) (ADA and Title VII); Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1999) (Title VII); Koveleskie v. SBC Capital Mkts., Inc., 
167 F.3d 361, 368 (7th Cir. 1999) (Title VII). 
 97. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24–25 (reasoning that the FAA’s purpose was to “reverse the 
longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements that had existed at English common 
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law of all lands.  However, because the agreement at issue in Gilmer was 
within a securities registration application, and not an employment 
contract, the Court ultimately failed to address whether Section 1 of the 
FAA applied to all employment contracts.98  This question remained 
unsolved.99 
Ten years later, the Court addressed Gilmer’s unsolved question in 
Circuit City Stores v. Adams.100  There, the Court expressly ruled that 
the FAA applied to all employment contracts except for those 
specifically exempted.101  This interpretation was extremely narrow 
because the FAA only exempts employment contracts of transportation 
workers.102  Circuit City Stores reinforced case law from lower federal 
courts and further encouraged the use of mandatory arbitration 
contracts.103   
After the Supreme Court issued these decisions, which asserted that 
arbitration is “favored” and permitted, businesses jumped at the 
opportunity to compel arbitration in contexts where they previously 
assumed such agreements would not be enforced.104 
D. Mandatory Arbitration Today 
Since Gilmer,105 arbitration has become a preferred method of 
dispute resolution for many employers who view it as faster and more 
cost effective than litigation.106  Today, more than fifty-five percent of 
 
law and had been adopted by American courts, and to place arbitration agreements upon the 
same footing as other contracts.”). 
 98. Id. at 26 (holding that arbitration may not be appropriate for all statutory claims and 
that in determining whether arbitration is suitable, courts should look to the text of the statute, 
its legislative history, and whether or not there is an “inherent conflict” between the statutory 
purpose and arbitration). 
 99. Although the majority in Gilmer did not address whether the FAA applied to 
employment contracts, the dissent discussed the issue and concluded that Congress did not 
intend for the FAA to apply to employment contracts at all. See id. at 39–41. Justice John Paul 
Stevens wrote “[T]he FAA specifically was intended to exclude arbitration agreements 
between employees and employers.” Id. at 40 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 100. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 101. Id. at 122–23. 
 102. Id. at 119. 
 103. Landry, supra note 24, at 488 (“The Circuit City decision clarified the broad scope 
of the FAA and seemed to affirm employers’ use of mandatory arbitration provisions in 
employment contracts”).   
 104. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1638. 
 105. 500 U.S. at 26. 
 106. Bales, supra note 19; see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
Alternative Dispute Resolution Policy Statement, reprinted in 133 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) at 
E-4 (July 17, 1995) (recognizing that if the circumstances are appropriate that ADR techniques 
can provide “faster, less expensive, less contentious, and more productive results in 
eliminating workplace discrimination”); see Bingham, supra note 61, at 189 (citing to studies 
that provide evidence of increase between 1991 and 1995 in number of employers using 
predispute employment arbitration agreements); Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, 
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nonunion, private-sector employees are bound by arbitration clauses.107  
Of the employers who require mandatory arbitration, about thirty percent 
include class action waivers—meaning that employees also lose their 
right to pursue collective legal action to address widespread rights 
violations.108 
Over this same period of time, however, state legislatures and 
courts have sought to regulate and invalidate various forms of arbitration 
agreements that they believed to be threatening to the interests of the 
state, its businesses, and its employers.109  However, most of the attempts 
to pass legislation or implement case law contrary to mandatory 
arbitration have been preempted by the FAA.   
It is unclear why states nevertheless attempt to pass legislation that 
is preempted.  Professor Sarah Rudolph Cole, at the Moritz College of 
Law, speculated that states may attempt to pass preempted legislation as 
a “purely symbolic” gesture, with the hope that such legislation might 
spur Congress to amend the FAA to allow states greater leeway to 
regulate arbitration.110  Professor Gary Spitko, at Santa Clara University 
School of Law, theorized that states might simply perceive the need for 
arbitration regulation to be so great that it is in their best interest to 
proceed with arguably preempted regulations until the Supreme Court 
rules on the preemption of the specific effort at issue.111 
E. Recent Legislation Regarding Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual 
Harassment in the Workplace 
While the general climate towards mandatory arbitration among 
courts and legislatures is positive, many have found mandatory 
arbitration agreements to be problematic in the context of statutory 
 
Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration 
Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223, 225 (1998) (asserting that “[t]he use of employment 
arbitration began to accelerate dramatically after the United States Supreme Court decided 
Gilmer”); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity 
Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007) (reviewing 
empirical studies and concluding that “[a]lthough there are limitations to the existing studies, 
they do show a consistent pattern of significant expansion of employment arbitration in the 
decade and a half since the Gilmer decision” and hypothesizing that “employment arbitration 
is likely already a more widespread system for governing employment relations than 
collective bargaining and labor arbitration”). 
 107. Colvin, supra note 3. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, Uniform Arbitration: “One Size Fits All” Does Not 
Fit, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL., 759, 785–87 (2001) (discussing various state statutes 
that purport to protect certain categories of disputants from compliance with predispute 
arbitration agreements). 
 110. Id. at 789.   
 111. E. Gary Spitko, Federal Arbitration Act Preemption of State Public Policy-Based 
Employment Arbitration Doctrine: An Autopsy and an Argument for Federal Agency 
Oversight, 20 HARV. NEG. L. REV. 1, 4 (2015). 
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complaints such as sexual assault, harassment, and discrimination.112  In 
recognition of the harms caused by forced arbitration of these types of 
complaints, some officials have taken steps to address the issue.113  The 
actions taken reflect a general understanding that forced arbitration can 
be unfair to employees; however, the measures taken nonetheless fall 
short of fully protecting employees.114 
In 2009, President Obama signed into law the first federal 
legislation that prevents employers from forcing binding arbitration on 
their employees.115  The Franken Amendment to the 2010 Defense 
Appropriations Bill116 was a small victory for opponents of arbitration, 
as it prevented the use of any funds made available under the Defense 
Appropriation Act if a contractor or subcontractor providing services or 
equipment under the Act requires its employees to arbitrate certain 
claims.117  These claims included: those arising under Title VII, or any 
torts relating to (or arising out of) sexual assault, harassment, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and more.118 
However, in the same year the Franken Amendment was passed, 
the Rape Victims Act of 2009119 failed.  If enacted, the act would have 
made any agreement to arbitrate a dispute unenforceable with respect to 
claims arising out of rape.120  Unlike the Franken Amendment, the Rape 
Victims Act would have applied to all employers, not just to federal 
contractors receiving funds under the particular act.121 
The approach taken by the Franken Amendment was subsequently 
extended to some federal contracts through the Fair Pay and Safe 
Workplaces Executive Order of 2014 (“FPSW”).122  The FPSW order 
bars all federal contractors with contracts of greater than one million 
dollars from enforcing mandatory arbitration agreements in claims based 
on Title VII, or tort claims involving sexual assault or harassment.123  
 
 112. See generally EEOC Notice, supra note 54; see Landry, supra note 24; see Katherine 
V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, Report, The arbitration epidemic: Mandatory 
arbitration deprives workers and consumers of their rights, ECONOMIC POLICY INST. (Dec. 
7, 2015), http://www.epi.org/publication/the-arbitration-epidemic/. 
 113. See infra notes 116–29. 
 114. DAVID SELIGMAN, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., MODEL STATE CONSUMER & 
EMPLOYEE JUSTICE ENFORCEMENT ACT 3 (Nov. 2015), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/arbitration/model-state-arb-act-2015.pdf. 
 115. See Dep’t of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118 § 8116, 123 
Stat. 3409, 3454 (2010) (Franken Amendment). 
 116. Id.  
 117. Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123 Stat. 3409 (2009). 
 118. Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116(a), 123 Stat. 3409 (2009). 
 119. Rape Victims Act of 2009, S. 2915, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id.; see Franken Amendment, supra note 115. 
 122. Exec. Order No. 13673, 79 Fed. Reg. 45309 (July 31, 2014). 
 123. Id. 
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The FPSW, although another win for opponents of mandatory 
arbitration, suffers from similar limitations as the Franken Amendment 
did as the Order only applies to a limited number of potential 
employment-related claims. 
In February 2018, state attorney generals (“AGs”) in all fifty states, 
the District of Columbia, and U.S. territories wrote a letter to 
Congressional leadership seeking the elimination of arbitration clauses 
in employment agreements for sex harassment claims.124  In the letter, 
the AGs objected to the “veil of secrecy” created by arbitration, which 
prevents similarly situated individuals from learning about the 
harassment claims, thereby precluding them from also seeking relief.125  
The letter also mentions the “Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual 
Harassment Act of 2017”126 that is pending in the U.S. Senate. 127  This 
legislation would prohibit the enforcement of an arbitration clause for 
claims based on sex under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.128 
Finally, and to this date, the most prominent effort to deal with 
mandatory arbitration at the federal level is the proposed Arbitration 
Fairness Act (“AFA”).129  Although various versions of the AFA exist, 
the most recent version would amend the FAA to specify that”no pre-
dispute arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires 
arbitration of an employment, consumer or franchise dispute, or a 
dispute arising under any statute intended to protect civil rights.”130  If 
enacted, the AFA would effectively eliminate all mandatory arbitration 
within employment and consumer realms, as well as in antitrust and civil 
rights cases.131  The AFA has been repeatedly introduced in Congress, 
with versions proposed in 2009, 2011, 2013, and most recently 2015.132  
However, the AFA has not received a vote, and passage in the current 
Congress appears unlikely.133 
 
 124. Letter from National Association of Attorneys General, to Congressional Leadership 
(Feb. 12, 2018), https://shpr.legislature.ca.gov/sites/shpr.legislature.ca.gov/files/Musell-
NAAG%20Letter%20re%20mandatory%20arbitration.pdf [hereinafter Letter from AGs]. 
 125. Id. 
 126. S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017–2018). 
 127. See Letter from AGs, supra note 124. 
 128. S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017–2018). 
 129. Proposed Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, S. 537, 115th Cong. § 402(a). 
The AFA was originally proposed in 2009 and the findings then suggested that the bill’s 
sponsors were primarily concerned with the inequality of bargaining power between 
employers and employees, the lack of meaningful choice, the potential for unfair arbitration 
procedures attendant to such inequality, and dissatisfaction with the lack of transparency in 
arbitration. H.R. 1020, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
 130. H.R. 1020, S. 931, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009). 
 131. Stone & Colvin, supra note 112. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. 
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F. The “Knowing and Voluntary” Requirement 
Some have suggested that Congress impose a requirement that 
employees agree to arbitrate Title VII claims “knowingly and 
voluntarily.”134  Generally, “knowing” means that an employee is aware 
of the arbitration agreement she is entering into, and “voluntary” means 
that she is willingly entering into it.135  At one point, the Ninth Circuit 
implemented a knowing standard, which required that an employee 
knowingly enter into a mandatory arbitration agreement for Title VII 
claims.136  In Prudential Insurance Co. of America v. Lai,137 the Ninth 
Circuit held that employers are required to inform employees who sign 
pre-dispute agreements that any employment discrimination claims will 
be subject to mandatory, binding arbitration.138  The Ninth Circuit’s 
standard has been questioned for its failure to define the parameters of a 
“knowing” requirement.139  Without establishing these parameters, 
employers are left to guess whether their employee “knowingly” agreed 
to arbitrate an employment discrimination claim. 
In Nelson v. Cyprus Bagdad Copper Corp.,140 the Ninth Circuit 
clarified the knowing requirement when it rejected an argument that an 
agreement to arbitrate an ADA claim could be inferred from the 
employer giving an employee an Employee Handbook containing 
arbitration provisions.141  The court held that “[a]ny bargain to waive the 
right to a judicial forum for civil rights claims . . . in exchange for 
employment or continued employment must at the least be express; the 
choice must be explicitly presented to the employee and the employee 
must explicitly agree to waive the specific right in question.”142  
Unfortunately, this standard is quite simple to meet,143and it is   
unforeseeable that this standard would make a significant impact on 
peoples’ decisions of whether to take a job. 
Moreover, as critics of this standard point out, the knowing 
requirement will have little effect if the agreement is not also 
voluntary.144  Unlike the knowing requirement, no court currently 
 
 134. See Joseph R. Grodin, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims: Doctrine 
and Policy in the Wake of Gilmer, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 28, 36 (1996). 
 135. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1907. 
 136. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 1305. 
 139. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1908. 
 140. 119 F.3d 756 (9th Cir. 1997). 
 141. Id. at 762. 
 142. Id. (emphasis added). 
 143. Keeping in mind that many people either do not understand what mandatory 
arbitration entails or have limited job prospects.  
 144. See Grodin, supra note 134, at 37. 
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requires that a waiver of Title VII claims be voluntary.145  To require 
courts to subjectively determine whether an arbitration clause was 
voluntarily entered into poses its own issues.  This Note will discuss why 
the knowing and voluntary standard does not effectively address the 
issues posed by mandatory arbitration in section IV.146 
III. ISSUE 
Employees are often required to sign arbitration agreements as 
conditions of employment.147  In these agreements, employees sign away 
their right to litigate employment-related disputes in front of a court, and 
instead agree to resolve all future claims—including statutory civil rights 
protections found in Title VII—through binding arbitration.148  While 
arbitration may be a faster and cheaper alternative to litigation, using the 
arbitral forum raises unique problems in the context of civil rights 
claims.  The problems surrounding the arbitration of Title VII claims 
include the nonconsensual nature of mandatory arbitration clauses, the 
alleged propensity for arbitral proceedings to be slanted in favor of the 
business, and restricted public accountability particularly in regard to 
statutory rights such as those under Title VII.149   
As a result of the lack of safeguards in place for employee’s rights, 
mandatory arbitration may be propagating sexual harassment cultures in 
the workplace.  Unfortunately, the combination of the FAA and a strong 
federal policy favoring mandatory arbitration compels courts to decide 
all disputes in favor of mandatory arbitration.150  Thus, in order to 
effectively reform the mandatory arbitration system, Congress, and 
Congress alone, must take action to create stricter regulations to 
safeguard the rights of employees and make arbitration a fair forum for 
statutory claims.   
IV. ANALYSIS 
In 2017, the floodgates sprung open when the media published 
sexual harassment allegations made against media mogul Harvey 
Weinstein.151  The Weinstein scandal sparked a national conversation 
 
 145. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1909. 
 146. See infra Section IV.D. 
 147. Eric Kolowitz, “I Didn’t Agree to Arbitrate That!”—How Courts Determine if 
Employees’ Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Claims Fall Within the Scope of Broad 
Mandatory Arbitration Clauses, 13 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 565, 570 (2012). 
 148. EEOC Notice, supra note 54, at Section I. 
 149. See id. at Section C.ii. 
 150. See id. at Section II.C. 
 151. Samantha Cooney, Here Are All the Public Figures Who’ve Been Accused of Sexual 
Misconduct After Harvey Weinstein, TIME (Jan. 26, 2018), http://time.com/5015204/harvey-
weinstein-scandal/. 
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about sexual misconduct in the workplace as women from all over felt 
encouraged to come forward with allegations of their own against 
prominent male figures, ranging from sexual misconduct and harassment 
to rape.152  Despite a number of the allegations leading to the men in 
question being dismissed or otherwise disciplined,153 the dismissal of 
these men remains the exception, not the rule.  While these particular 
dismissals culminated from the heavy publicity surrounding the 
allegations, not all harassment claims are visible to the public eye.  Even 
some of the individuals hit publicly with harassment charges are 
sometimes able to carry on unharmed in their careers. The most 
prominent example being President Donald Trump, who was accused of 
sexual harassment by several women while in the running for President, 
and still succeeded in the 2016 Presidential election.154 
In the past seven years, United States companies have paid out more 
than $295 million in public penalties over sexual harassment claims.155  
Too often, sexual harassment in the workplace remains hidden and 
businesses fail to take disciplinary action until they feel threatened by 
bad publicity.156  The fact that existing anti-discrimination and 
harassment laws, such as Title VII, fail to prevent such culpable actions 
tends to suggest that some form of legal reform is needed.  The next 
section of this analysis seeks to understand the weaknesses in the current 
legislation based on a case analysis of Gretchen Carlson and the 
harassment scandal at Fox News. 
A. How Title VII Failed to Prevent Harassment at Fox News 
In the last few years, dozens of women at Fox News came forward 
with sexual harassment allegations against men at the Fox network.157  
After significant negative press coverage, Fox News was hard pressed to 
fire many of the accused, costing the network over eighty million dollars 
in pay-outs to the departing executives and settlements to the alleged 
 
 152. Id. 
 153. Corynne Cirilli, High Profile Men Accused of Sexual Harassment and Sexual 
Abuse, COVETEUR: NEWS (Nov. 29, 2017), http://coveteur.com/2017/11/29/harvey-
weinstein-sexual-harassment-repercussions/. 
 154. Danielle Kurtzleben, Here’s the List of Women Who Accused Donald Trump of 
Sexual Misconduct, NPR, Oct. 20, 2016, https://www.npr.org/2016/10/13/497799354/a-list-
of-donald-trumps-accusers-of-inappropriate-sexual-conduct. 
 155. U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGES ALLEGING SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT FY 2010-FY 2018, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm (Jan. 14, 
2018).   
 156. See infra Section IV.A. 
 157. Kate W. Nuñez, Toxic Cultures Require a Stronger Cure: The Lessons of Fox News 
for Reforming Sexual Harassment Law, PENN. STATE. L. REV. 463, 465 (Aug. 1, 2017). 
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victims.158  Despite these charges, the legal prohibitions against sexual 
harassment in the workplace failed to deter Fox News from ignoring the 
rampant harassment for years.  For example, in January of 2016, after 
settling multiple cases regarding Bill O’Reilly’s misconduct with female 
employees, Fox News nevertheless renewed O’Reilly’s employment 
contract.159  Fox News was, at the time, fully aware of the harassment 
allegations made against O’Reilly.160 It is likely that the reason Fox 
News was able to retain O’Reilly for so long, despite the recurring 
allegations, was because the network circumvented anti-harassment laws 
through the use of mandatory arbitration clauses.   
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964161 is a federal law that 
prohibits sexual harassment.  Under Title VII, harassment based on race, 
color, sex, national origin, or religion constitutes discrimination.162  
However, Title VII is often critiqued for its failure to deter sexual 
harassment in the workplace.163 
One established critique of Title VII, regarded as the “standards and 
defenses critique,” may partially explain why Title VII fails to have the 
deterrent effect desired.164  According to this critique, Title VII 
encourages only superficial compliance without actually preventing or 
punishing harassment, makes it too difficult for employees to prove their 
claims, and fails to adequately protect employees who choose to report 
harassment.165  However, the “standards and defenses critique” fails to 
fully explain the events that occurred at Fox News because Title VII was 
not the only law in play.  Fox News is located in New York City, which 
is governed by a stricter law prohibiting harassment in the workplace—
the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”).166  The NYCHRL 
has a lower standard for proving harassment and provides greater 
protections against retaliation.167  Nevertheless, even the existence of 
this stricter anti-discrimination law failed to deter the widespread 
 
 158. Emily Steel & Michael Schmidt, Bill O’Reilly Thrives at Fox News, Even as 
Harassment Settlements Add Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2017. 
 159. Doug Stanglin, Report: Fox kept Bill O’Reilly despite $32M sexual harassment 
settlement, USA TODAY, Oct. 21, 2017, 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/10/21/report-bill-oreilly-struck-sexual-
harassment-deal-january-former-fox-analyst/787360001/. 
 160. John Bacon, Bill O’Reilly dismisses NYT report as ‘lies and smears,’ USA TODAY, 
Oct. 22, 2017, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/10/22/bill-oreilly-
dismissed-nyt-report-lies-and-smears/788461001/. 
 161. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West). 
 162. E.g., Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64–65 (1986). 
 163. See supra note 157. 
 164. See Joanna L. Grossman, The First Bite is Free: Employer Liability for Sexual 
Harassment, 61 U. PITT. L. REV. 671, 700–06 (2000). 
 165. Id.   
 166. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(1)(a). 
 167. Id.; see Nuñez, supra note 157, at 49–96. 
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harassment at Fox News.  These facts suggest that an effective reform of 
discrimination law will take more than merely strengthening a plaintiff’s 
individual claims through additional legislation. 
1. The Fox News Scandal 
Gretchen Carlson joined Fox News in 2005.168  From 2006 to 2013, 
Carlson was the co-host of the “Fox & Friends” morning show.169  
Carlson alleges that during her time on the Fox program she experienced 
sexist and condescending behavior by her co-host, Steve Doocy.170  
Carlson first complained to her supervisor about Doocy’s behavior in 
September 2009.171  Shortly after Carlson filed this complaint, her work 
environment began to change.  Carlson alleges that in response to her 
complaint, Roger Ailes called her a “man hater” and “killer” who 
“needed to learn to ‘get along with the boys.’”172  Carlson further alleges 
that Ailes retaliated against her by assigning her fewer interviews, 
ending her regular appearances on “The O’Reilly Factor,” failing to 
showcase her to the public, and more.173  According to Carlson, this 
retaliatory conduct eventually led to her removal from the “Fox & 
Friends” program altogether, her reassignment to a less desirable 
afternoon slot, and a reduction in pay.174 
Carlson’s complaint also listed a variety of harassment claims 
against Ailes.175  Some of the alleged actions include: (a) claiming that 
Carlson saw everything as if it “only rains on women” and admonishing 
her to stop worrying about being treated equally and getting “offended 
so God damn easy about everything;” (b) ogling Carlson in his office 
and asking her to turn around so he could view her posterior; (c) 
commenting that certain outfits enhanced Carlson’s figure and urging 
her to wear them every day; (d) commenting repeatedly about Carlson’s 
legs; (e) lamenting that marriage was “boring,” “hard,” and “not much 
fun;” (f) wondering aloud how anyone could be married to Carlson, 
while making sexual advances by various means, including by stating 
that if he could choose one person to be stranded with on a desert island, 
she would be that person; (g) asking Carlson how she felt about him, 
followed by: “Do you understand what I’m saying to you?;” (h) boasting 
to other attendees at an event where Carlson walked over to greet him 
 
 168. Complaint and Jury Demand ¶ 8, Carlson v. Ailes, No. BEL-L-005016-16 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Law Div. July 6, 2016) [hereinafter Carlson Complaint]. 
 169. Id. at ¶ 10; GRETCHEN CARLSON, https://www.gretchencarlson.com/about. 
 170. Carlson Complaint, supra note 168, at ¶ 11. 
 171. Id.   
 172. Id. at ¶ 13. 
 173. Id. at ¶ 14. 
 174. Id. at ¶¶ 16–17. 
 175. See generally id. ¶¶20–22. 
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that he always stays seated when a woman walks over to him so she has 
to “bend over” to say hello; and (i) telling Carlson that she was “sexy,” 
but “too much hard work.”176 
On June 23, 2016, Fox News refused to renew Carlson’s contract.177  
The next month Carlson filed a lawsuit against Ailes individually, 
asserting claims of harassment and retaliation under the NYCHRL.178  
Instead of suing Fox News under Title VII, Carlson strategically chose 
to sue Ailes individually under the NYCHRL because her employment 
contract with Fox News required mandatory confidential arbitration of 
any claims against the network.179  Ailes attempted to compel arbitration, 
but the case reached settlement before the court was able to decide on 
the issue.180  While Fox News paid Carlson twenty million dollars to 
settle the case,181 they negotiated a price twice as high—forty million 
dollars—as a payout to Ailes for his departure.182 
Shortly after Carlson filed her suit, another former Fox News host, 
Andrea Tantaros, filed a complaint bringing similar sexual harassment 
and retaliation allegations against Ailes.183  In her complaint, Tantaros 
alleged that Ailes frequently made sexual remarks directed at her and 
other Fox News employees about their relationships and sexuality.184  
The alleged retaliation against Tantaros for complaining about the 
harassment included actions by Fox News media relations personnel 
such as: failing to provide media support, denying interview requests of 
Tantaros, crafting and placing false and negative stories about Tantaros, 
 
 176. Id. ¶ 20. 
 177. Id. ¶ 25. 
 178. Id. ¶ 4. 
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“Any controversy, claim or dispute arising out of or relating to this Agreement or Performer’s 
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then in effect . . . . Such arbitration, all filings, evidence and testimony connected with the 
arbitration, and all relevant allegations and events leading up to the arbitration, shall be held 
in strict confidence.” Certification of Barry Asen in Support of Defendant Roger Ailes’s 
Motion to Compel Arbitration, Exhibit A, Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. July 
8, 2016). 
 180. See Notice of Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay All Further Judicial 
Proceedings, Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. July 8, 2016); Order of Voluntarily 
Dismissal, Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16-cv-04138 (D.N.J. Sept. 6, 2016); Petition to Compel 
Arbitration, Ailes v. Carlson, No. 1:16-cv-5671 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016); Notice of Voluntary 
Dismissal, Ailes v. Carlson, No. 1:16-cv-5671 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2016). 
 181. Bill Chappel, Fox Will Pay Gretchen Carlson $20 Million to Settle Sexual 
Harassment Suit, NPR: AMERICA (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-
way/2016/09/06/492797695/fox-news-will-pay-gretchen-carlson-20-million-to-settle-
sexual-harassment-suit. 
 182. Nuñez, supra note 157, at 470. 
 183. Complaint, Tantaros v. Fox News Network, et al., No. 157054/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Aug. 22, 2016) [hereinafter Tantaros Complaint]. 
 184. Id. at ¶ 5(a)-(e). 
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and posting negative social media comments about her using fake 
accounts.185  When Tantaros complained of the harassment and 
retaliation to senior Fox News executive, William Shine, he allegedly 
warned her that Ailes was a “very powerful man” and Tantaros 
“need[ed] to let this one go.”186 
Turning down a settlement offer in excess of one million dollars to 
keep her claims quiet,187 Tantaros instead filed her complaint in New 
York State court alleging claims against Fox News and a number of 
executives including Ailes.188  This time the defendants were successful 
in compelling confidential arbitration,189 and as a result the outcome of 
this proceeding remains private.  Since the Carlson and Tantaros suits, 
many others have come forward and Fox News has reportedly reached 
settlements with at least six women who accused Ailes of sexual 
harassment.190 
One query that arises when reviewing these complaints is whether, 
without the high profiles of the victims and defendants involved, there 
would have been enough press and media coverage to pressure Fox 
News into taking action against the alleged offender?  Here, non-legal 
forces ultimately led Fox News to fire the perpetrators, but both federal 
and state law failed to do so despite years of allegations.  This 
unfortunate reality begs the question of why it took this long-winded 
series of events for Fox to rectify and take action against conduct that is 
already prohibited by the law. 
2. How Mandatory Arbitration Undermines Laws such as Title VII 
While there are laws in existence which protect employees from 
sexual harassment, such as Title VII, these laws do a poor job of 
deterring such behavior, as evidenced by the happenings at Fox News191 
and the exponentially growing number of sexual harassment claims 
filed.192  One explanation for why these laws are so easily circumvented 
is that mandatory arbitration clauses undermine the law by allowing 
employers to secretly pay out victims and brush harassment claims under 
the rug.  For example, Fox News paid millions of dollars over the years 
 
 185. Id. at ¶ 6). 
 186. Id. at ¶ 7. 
 187. Nuñez, supra note 157, at 471. 
 188. Tantaros Complaint, supra note 183, ¶ ¶ 75-98. 
 189. Nuñez, supra note 157, at 472. (citing Order on Motion to Compel Arbitration, 
Tantaros v. Fox News Network LLC, No. 157054/2016 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 2, 2017).   
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Harassment Settlements Add Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2017, at A1. 
 191. See supra Section IV.A.i. 
 192. 12,860 claims were filed at the EEOC in 2016 alone. EEOC, supra note 157. This 
does not include charges filed at state or local Fair Employment Practice Agencies. Id. 
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to settle harassment claims against Bill O’Reilly.193  Since most of these 
claims never reached the courtroom, the full extent of O’Reilly’s abuse 
was hidden from the public eye.194  Only when Carlson took 
extraordinary steps to avoid arbitration did the harassment at Fox News 
become a big enough news story to pressure Fox News into dismissing 
O’Reilly.195 
As a term of employment, Fox News requires many of its 
employees to agree to confidential binding arbitration.196  Gretchen 
Carlson, for example, was a party to such an agreement.197  Because of 
the arbitration clause in her employment contract, Carlson’s only option 
for filing a public suit and bringing to light the harassment was suing 
Ailes individually.198  However, even her ability to individually sue Ailes 
was zealously disputed and remained unresolved before settlement.199  In 
fact, her individual cause of action against Ailes would have been 
unavailable in most jurisdictions; the NYCHRL allowed Carlson to sue 
Ailes individually, an action not permitted under federal law.200  In 
addition, while the particular language in Carlson’s contract left some 
wiggle room for excluding individual claims against executives from 
arbitration, most contracts do not permit this.201  Overall, it was the 
culmination of these uncommon circumstances that brought Carlson’s 
case into the public eye.   
 
 193. Steel & Schmidt, supra note 190.   
 194. See id. 
 195. See Carlson Complaint, supra note 168. 
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Carlson v. Ailes, No. 2:16- cv-04138 (D.N.J. July 8, 2016); Order of Voluntarily Dismissal, 
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 200. N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-107(1)(a) (“It shall be an unlawful discriminatory 
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§ 2000e-2(a) (2015) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . “) 
(emphasis added). 
 201. See Eric Wemple, Roger Ailes Opts for Secrecy, Cowardice, in Face of Gretchen 
Carlson Suit, WASHINGTON POST, July 9, 2016 (“Ailes is not named in [the arbitration 
agreement]. Their argument is that FOX means Ailes. They should have written more broadly, 
most arbitration clauses name others who work for or with, are associated with, etc. I consider 
him a non-party under this language. Poor drafting.” (quoting Paul Bland, executive director 
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Considering the foregoing, Title VII alone cannot be blamed for its 
failure to deter the sexual harassment culture at Fox News.  The private, 
confidential nature of mandatory arbitration not only keeps sexual 
harassment allegations out of court, but also out of the public domain.  If 
confidential arbitration contributes to the lack of deterrent effect 
imposed by existing discrimination laws, then one solution may be to 
pursue legislation and encourage activism to make arbitration decisions 
more public and subject to greater judicial review.  This idea will be 
further addressed below.202 
B. Inadequacies of the Current Arbitration System in Addressing Title 
VII Claims 
1. Mandatory Arbitration Clauses are Nonconsensual and 
Inherently Unfair 
Under even the most reasonable definitions, many would argue that 
mandatory arbitration clauses are nonconsensual given that most 
employees fail to read, let alone understand, the clauses.203  Even if 
employees understand arbitration provisions, the majority lack any 
meaningful choice when entering into these agreements because 
employers have exclusive control over the terms of the employment 
relationship.204  Employees often have no power to bargain for better 
terms.  This power imbalance results in contracts that are not bargained-
for exchanges.205  Economic climate further exacerbates the divide in 
bargaining power as applicants who are limited in employment options 
have little choice but to sign the agreement.206  Despite this lack of 
bargained-for exchange, courts continue to uphold arbitration 
agreements as a matter of contract.207 
When posed with this concern, proponents of mandatory arbitration 
will respond by questioning why employment contracts should be 
treated or enforced any differently than other contracts. To be 
enforceable, a contract requires mutual assent and consideration.208  
People sign contracts every day that they fail to read or understand.  
 
 202. See infra Sections IV.B.iii & V. 
 203. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 30, at 1649; see also infra 
Section II.B.i. 
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 207. Id. at 246. 
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These contracts are nevertheless enforced.  If courts began to treat 
employment contracts differently based on the notion that employees fail 
to understand the terms or have unequal bargaining power, and therefore 
agree involuntarily, where would the line be drawn?209 
However, critics also argue that mandatory arbitration is wrong as 
a matter of public policy because it eliminates individuals’ rights to have 
a trial before a judge or jury.210  Even in Gilmer, the case that originally 
confirmed the use of mandatory arbitration, the Court recognized that 
subjecting Title VII claims to mandatory arbitration was inconsistent 
with Congress’ goal because Congress had empowered the federal courts 
to litigate Title VII claims.211 
Title VII was enacted to ensure equal opportunity in employment, 
and to secure the fundamental right to equal protection guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.212  “Congress explicitly entrusted the primary 
responsibility for the interpretation, administration, and enforcement of 
these standards, and the public values they embody, to the federal 
government.”213  It did so in three ways.  First, Congress created the 
Commission, initially giving it authority to investigate claims of 
discrimination and to interpret the law,214 and subsequently giving it 
litigation authority to bring cases to court that it could not resolve 
administratively.215  Second, Congress granted certain enforcement 
authority to the Department of Justice.216  Third, Congress established a 
private right of action to enable aggrieved individuals to bring their 
claims directly in federal court, after initially bringing their claims to the 
Commission for administrative purposes.217  Mandatory arbitration 
effectively does away with this third avenue of enforcement. 
This private right of access to courts is an essential part of the 
statutory enforcement scheme,218 but mandatory arbitration essentially 
“privatizes” the enforcement of federal discrimination laws.219  The 
imposition of mandatory arbitration substitutes a private dispute 
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resolution system for the public justice system intended by Congress.220  
This private arbitral system is different in many ways from the judicial 
forum.  When issues do arise, such as sexual harassment claims like 
those brought by Andrea Tantaros, employees have no avenue to resolve 
the dispute except through arbitration.221  In arbitration, employees may 
then be pressured into settling their complaints in private, out of sight 
from public speculation, and without the chance to hold the offender 
publicly accountable.222 
2. Mandatory Arbitration Can Be Biased Towards Employees 
Critics contend that arbitration proceedings have a tendency to be 
biased against the employee.223  Employers imposing mandatory 
arbitration through clauses in employment contracts have the ability to 
manipulate the arbitral mechanism to their benefit.224   
Mandatory arbitration clauses are drafted by employers and 
imposed on employees particularly because employers believe them to 
be in their own best interest.225  It should thus come as no surprise that 
the system may often fall short of being fair.  The ability of businesses 
to draft agreements in their own favor is made possible by their superior 
bargaining power,226 and these agreements consequentially reinforce this 
bargaining power.  Proponents of arbitration, however, suggest that this 
argument applies to litigation just the same, and that employers always 
have superior bargaining power and that is the way of business.227   
Another argument relevant to biases found in arbitration is that the 
employer is at an advantage as the “repeat player.”228  While it is likely 
the employer has participated in many arbitration proceedings, the 
employee has not.229  As a result, the employee is generally less adept in 
making an informed selection of arbitrators than the employer who 
knows more about arbitrators’ records.230  However, this same point 
could arguably be made about litigation.  It is unlikely that an employee, 
who is unable to afford representation, will bode well in court against an 
experienced attorney representing the employer. 
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Finally, opponents argue that arbitrators could be influenced by the 
fact that the employer, not the employee, provides them with future 
business.231  A recent study of employment law cases revealed this bias, 
finding that the more frequently an employer uses arbitration, the better 
the employer fared in arbitration.232   
3. Confidential Nature of Mandatory Arbitration Leads to a Lack 
of Public Accountability 
The limited judicial review of arbitration awards results in a general 
failure to control and discipline errant arbitrators, to expose employers 
to public scrutiny, and to develop new law through precedent.233 
For one, arbitrators are hired by private parties and do not have to 
answer to public scrutiny.234  “While the courts are charged with giving 
force to the public values reflected in the anti-discrimination laws, the 
arbitrator proceeds from a far narrower perspective: resolution of the 
immediate dispute.”235  Title VII, for example, was created to enforce 
the public interest in combating employment discrimination.236  
Plaintiffs’ awards in Title VII lawsuits, especially the larger and more 
well-known ones, often serve as a notice to the public of the extreme 
costs of permitting discrimination in the workplace.237 
While published decisions by courts expose the identities of the 
accused, private arbitration awards keep these identities hidden.238  “The 
risks of negative publicity and blemished business reputation can be 
powerful influences on behavior.”239  Without a public trial, there may 
be less negative publicity, which translates into less incentive for 
employers to act fairly toward employees.240  As a result, arbitration 
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permits the immediate resolution of disputes, but fails to uphold the 
public values behind the law.241 
Furthermore, arbitration affords very little opportunity for the 
development of new legal precedent due to the limited judicial review of 
arbitrators’ decisions.242 This too deters public accountability because 
the absence of new legal standards permits offenders to get away with 
such acts.  Not only is development of the law stifled, but individual 
decisions by arbitrators are virtually free from scrutiny.243  Higher courts 
and Congress are therefore unable to correct the potential errors of 
statutory interpretation made by arbitrators.244 
Finally, the unavailability of judicial review or private arbitration 
undermines existing antidiscrimination laws.245  Because arbiters may 
apply Title VII law in conflicting manners, employers and employees 
may become confused, or may lack a uniform understanding or 
definition of discrimination.246  This issue is also explored in Section 
IV(A)(ii) above and a proposal identifying one way to address it is 
introduced in Section V below. 
C. Working Around the FAA’s Preemption of State Legislation   
More recently, federal agencies, legislators, and commentators 
alike have expressed their concerns pertaining to mandatory arbitration 
of statutory civil rights claims.247  Some actors have taken steps to try to 
mitigate the negative effects of such agreements.248  Currently, the most 
prominent effort to deal with mandatory arbitration at a federal level is 
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the proposed Arbitration Fairness Act (“AFA”).249  Various versions of 
this statute have been proposed,250 but the most recent version seeks to 
amend the FAA to specify that “no pre-dispute arbitration agreement 
shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment 
dispute, consumer dispute, antitrust dispute, or civil rights dispute.”251  
Although the AFA has drawn the support of many scholars,252 it is 
unlikely to pass in the current political climate.253  However, without 
some other form of federal action, it is likely that the FAA will continue 
to preempt most state laws that attempt to limit forced arbitration.254 
Despite these attempts to address the issues that stem from 
mandatory arbitration, the system today remains inadequate in 
protecting employees’ rights.  In light of this reality, the National 
Consumer Law Center (“NCLC”) proposed a Model State Consumer 
and Employee Justice Enforcement Act (the “Model Act”)255 to provide 
model language for alternative state solutions.256  The Model Act was 
designed to mitigate the harms of arbitration while still operating within 
the confines of state action available under the FAA.257  While there are 
many arguments that such regulations would nevertheless be preempted 
by the FAA, states can still look to the Model Act for examples of 
potential solutions. 
 
 249. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, S. 537, 115th Cong. 
 250. Stone & Colvin, supra note 112 (different version of the AFA were proposed in 2009, 
2011, and 2013).   
 251. Id. 
 252. See, e.g., Sarah Rudolph Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration Fairness 
Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 468 
(2011); Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?, supra note 8, at 726; Imre Stephen Szalai, 
More than Class Action Killers: The Impact of Concepcion and American Express on 
Employment Arbitration, 35 BERKLEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 31, 55–56 (2014). 
 253. For example, the AFA has no Republican co-sponsors in either the House or Senate. 
See H.R. 1374, S. 537.  Critics argue that the AFA is too broad and that a “blanket prohibition 
on the enforcement of arbitration clauses” is unwarranted. Erin O’Hara O’Connor, Kenneth 
J. Martin, & Randall S. Thomas, Customizing Employment Arbitration, 98 IOWA L. REV. 133, 
182 (2012). 
 254. AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Seligman, supra note 248, 
at 62. 
 255. See Seligman, supra note 248. 
 256. See generally id. 
 257. Seligman, supra note 248, at 62. Although, the FAA preempts any state law that 
limits forced arbitration, the proponents of the Model Act see room for state action in: (a) 
using state’s public enforcement and procurement powers to protects its own financial and 
enforcement interests; (b) regulating the formation of arbitration agreements rather than their 
enforcement; (c) unconscionability challenges to arbitration agreements “as long as what 
renders such clauses unfair is not a ‘fundamental’ attribute of arbitration;” (d) limiting 
enforcement of arbitration agreements in insurance contracts, contracts regarding 
transportation workers, and contracts that do not involve interstate commerce or when the 
parties agree state law applies, areas exempted from FAA preemption; (e) regulating private 
companies that administer arbitrations; (f) drafting procedures for litigating questions about 
arbitration in state court. Id. at 62–63. 
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Title I of the Model Act allows private attorneys generals to bring 
actions on behalf of the state and its interests.258  Under many state 
employment statutes, private actions are supplementary to an underlying 
state right to bring its own enforcement proceedings.259  However, 
because States generally lack the budget to play a substantial 
enforcement role, Title I proposes to delegate the state enforcement 
power to private attorneys.260  This could encourage private attorneys to 
take on more of these cases.261   
Title II of the Model Act prohibits the state from contracting with 
any companies that use forced arbitration in their contracts with either 
consumers or employees.262  This utilizes a State’s marketplace power to 
discourage businesses from using mandatory arbitration clauses in their 
employment contracts.263  Title III of the Model Act aims to protect 
employees at the formation of an agreement by requiring arbitration 
contracts to “adequately disclose terms and condition[s].”264  Title IV of 
the Model Act creates rebuttable presumptions that certain mandatory 
arbitration provisions are unconscionable, such as: inconvenient venues, 
waiver of rights to seek remedies provided by statute, waiver of right to 
seek punitive damages, and a requirement that the individual pay costs 
of arbitration that exceed the court cost of bringing a state or federal 
claim.265  In addition to these provisions, the Model Act offers four other 
sections aimed at the areas of arbitration law not preempted by federal 
law.266 
The Model Act was drafted as an idea for states to pass non-
preempted laws directed at mandatory arbitration.  However, due to a 
 
 258. Id. at 61. 
 259. Id. at 60–61. 
 260. Seligman, supra note 248, at 65. (“A person may initiate on behalf of the State an 
action alleging violations of [designated State consumer and worker protection statutes] to 
recover civil penalties on behalf of the State and to seek injunctive, declaratory, or other 
equitable relief that the State would itself be entitled to seek.”) 
 261. For an argument as to why this type of “Iskanian” doctrine would be preempted by 
the FAA, see Spitko, supra note 111. 
 262. Seligman, supra note 248, at 31. (“The State shall not do business with any person 
or any of its parent entities or subsidiaries if that person includes forced arbitration clauses in 
any of its contracts with consumers or employees . . .”). 
 263. See id. at 33. 
 264. Id. at 39 (“This title applies to contracts [the categories of which are to be determined 
by each state] formed after this Title’s effective date that meet any one of the following three 
criteria: (a) An employment or consumer contract not written in plain language that an average 
consumer or employee would understand; (b) An employment or consumer contract not 
written in the language in which the transaction was conducted, unless it can be proven that 
fewer than ten percent (10%) of the entity’s transactions are conducted in that language; or 
(c) if a consumer contract, all of the material terms are not found in a single document.”). For 
an argument as to why this would be preempted by the FAA, see Spitko, supra note 111. 
 265. Id. at 43. 
 266. Id. at 48–55. 
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concern that their efforts will be preempted by federal law, many states 
do not even attempt to draft such legislation.267  Similar regulations, 
adopted by Congress, would allow employees and employers alike to 
reap the benefits of mandatory arbitration while avoiding the negative 
aspects employees often face.  Whereas state-level legislative action 
always runs the risk of being challenged under the FAA, legislation 
passed by Congress would encounter no such issue. 
D. Why the “Knowing and Voluntary” Standard Would Fail to Address 
the Inadequacies of Mandatory Arbitration 
In Part II(F)268 this Note discussed the idea of implementing a 
“knowing and voluntary” standard for arbitration agreements.  This type 
of standard aims to address the concern that employees sign away their 
rights to litigate future complaints involuntarily due to a lack of 
understanding of the agreement.269  In making the dispute resolution 
process fairer, some believe that a higher standard of consent would 
ensure that employees are fully aware of their decision when they accept 
an arbitration agreement.270  The “knowing and voluntary” standard has 
been suggested as a mechanism for doing so.271  Generally, “knowing” 
means that an employee is aware of the arbitration agreement she is 
entering into, and “voluntary” means that she is willingly entering into 
it.272 
Some circuits, such as the Ninth Circuit, have attempted to 
implement a variation of this standard.  In Prudential, the Ninth Circuit 
required that an employee knowingly enter into mandatory arbitration 
for any Title VII claims.273  However, this standard only mandated that 
an arbitration agreement be express, which can be objectively measured 
by examining the language of the agreement.274  Requiring an express 
statement acknowledging mandatory arbitration in an employment 
 
 267. Seligman, supra note 248 at 63. 
 268. See infra Section F. 
 269. See Siderman, supra note 25, at 1889–90. 
 270. Id. 
 271. The knowing and voluntary language originated in a footnote in Gardner-Denver and 
was used in floor debates preceding the passage of the CRA. See Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 52 n.15 (1974) (“In determining the effectiveness of any such 
waiver, a court would have to determine at the outset that the employee’s consent. . .was 
voluntary and knowing.”). During floor debates over the CRA, Senator Robert Dole stated 
that Section 118 encouraged arbitration only when “parties knowingly and voluntarily elect 
to use these methods.” 137 CONG. REC. S15478 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1991) (statement of Sen. 
Dole). 
 272. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1907. 
 273. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 274. Renteria v. Prudential Ins. Co., 113 F.3d 1104, 1108 (9th Cir. 1997). 
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contract may be helpful to employees who read and understand the 
clause, but does little to ensure that the agreement is also “voluntary.”   
No court has attempted to implement a requirement that waivers of 
Title VII claims be voluntary.275  Simply having a “knowing” 
requirement without the “voluntary” counterpart will have little effect in 
balancing the scales for employees.  Unfortunately, requiring a 
“voluntary” requirement may unintentionally cause more issues than it 
prevents because a true voluntary waiver of statutory rights can only 
apply after a dispute has arisen.276  Proponents of the voluntary 
requirement argue that an employee’s consent to a nonnegotiable term 
of employment cannot be voluntary, and thus neither can mandatory 
arbitration agreements.277  Based on this interpretation, imposing a 
voluntary requirement on arbitration would effectively eliminate 
mandatory arbitration agreements altogether.278  This may be the reason 
courts have yet to insist on such a standard. 
Another reason courts may dislike the voluntary standard is because 
of its potential to increase timely and costly litigation.  Whether or not 
an arbitration clause is voluntarily entered into requires a subjective 
determination.279  This necessitates a close evaluation of an employee’s 
state of mind.280  Such a heightened standard would open every 
mandatory arbitration agreement to debate, as employees and employers 
would argue over whether the agreement was actually entered into 
knowingly and voluntarily.281  Instead of fixing the arbitration system, a 
“knowing and voluntary” standard might derail it.282  If litigation was an 
expected side effect, it would no longer be worthwhile to use the 
arbitration system, which was designed to be efficient and cost 
effective.283  Regardless, any such voluntary standard is likely preempted 
by the FAA.284  While some courts and legislatures nevertheless permit 
 
 275. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1909 (“The EEOC and most commentators agree that a 
voluntary waiver of statutory rights can only apply after a dispute has arisen.”). 
 276. Id. 
 277. See Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 83, 107 (1996). 
 278. See id. 
 279. Siderman, supra note 25, at 1909. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Employment 
Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1358 (1997) (explaining that the determination of whether 
a contract was voluntarily entered into “will be subject to the vagaries of after-the-fact 
litigation” and will “inject an additional element of uncertainty” into determining whether the 
agreements are binding). 
 282. Which is why this type of regulation would also be likely pre-empted by the FAA. 
 283. See Estreicher, supra note 281, at 1358–59. 
 284. A state law may not “stand [] as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of 
the full purposes and objectives” of the FAA. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Leland Stanford Univ., 
489 U.S. 468, 477–78 (1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 
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and enforce such standards, they are likely to be overturned by the 
Supreme Court.285 
Finally, if pre-dispute arbitration clauses were completely 
voluntary, they would be optional.  If mandatory arbitration became 
optional, most employers would not voluntarily choose to arbitrate their 
claims.286  Employees would not have the resources to pursue lesser 
claims and would have a hard time finding lawyers to represent them.287  
Thus, employers, knowing that most employees lack the resources to 
bring smaller claims to court, would have no incentive to voluntarily 
arbitrate the same claim.288  “If, however, employers are bound to 
arbitrate by a compulsory arbitration agreement, minor as well as more 
formidable claims will be heard.”289 
Oftentimes when critics of mandatory arbitration suggest that it 
should be rid of altogether, they overlook its potential benefits.  
Mandatory arbitration is not an inherently negative facet of the legal 
world.  Instead of implementing a “knowing and voluntary” standard, or 
trying to forbid mandatory arbitration altogether, the arbitration system 
needs to be improved.  By providing a controlled system of arbitration, 
reformed to accommodate the needs of employees, the goals of the 
“knowing and voluntary” standard can be met without deterring from the 
usefulness and effectiveness of arbitration. 
V. PROPOSAL 
Although mandatory arbitration is not a characteristically malicious 
alternative to dispute resolution, there are many aspects of mandatory 
arbitration that must be safeguarded in order to prevent large businesses 
from taking advantage of employees’ lack of bargaining power.  
Specifically, Congress must account for the shortcomings of arbitration 
to ensure that employees receive the rights Congress intended when 
drafting Title VII.  After identifying the problems in the current 
arbitration system, Congress must take the lead in implementing change, 
because most state actions regarding mandatory arbitration will be 
subjected to scrutiny or preempted without some sort of amendment to 
the FAA. 
 
 285. See Spitko, supra note 111 at 8. 
 286. “There was credible testimony by management representatives before the Dunlop 
Commission that employers would generally not be willing to enter into post-dispute 
agreements to arbitrate.” U.S. DEPT’S OF COMM. & LABOR, FACT FINDING REPORT: COMM’N 
ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MGMT. RELATIONS 118 (May 1994). 
 287. St. Antoine, supra note 42, at 8. 
 288. See Siderman, supra note 25, at 1894. 
 289. Id. 
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The most direct way to address the issues mandatory arbitration 
poses to statutory rights, such as Title VII, is for Congress to amend the 
FAA to exempt all arbitration of such claims.  However, the current 
political climate towards eradicating mandatory arbitration altogether is 
not friendly,290 and completely eliminating mandatory arbitration is not 
the best solution.291  Another alternative is exempting from the FAA 
arbitration of discrimination claims under Title VII.292  An apparent issue 
with this is that if Congress exempted only discrimination claims, 
employees bringing several claims against employers would be forced 
to split their claims between arbitration and litigation.  This would be 
extremely costly for both sides and would defeat the efficiency rationale 
behind mandatory arbitration. 
While many critics of arbitration propose drastic changes and 
amendments to the FAA, the reality is that Congress is unlikely to alter 
the FAA in such an extreme manner.293  Instead, this author proposes 
that we take the middle ground and push for Congress to amend the FAA 
in a manner that gives States more regulation power over employment 
arbitration as to protect the interests of workers related to state and 
federal statutory schemes such as Title VII.  This approach would allow 
each state to tailor their arbitration laws to address the concerns and 
needs specific to its employees. 
Accordingly, this author proposes that Congress amend the FAA to 
limit its preemptive scope by granting States the authority to establish 
various procedural regulations on arbitral proceedings.  Specifically, the 
procedures States should regulate are: (1) greater judicial review of 
arbitration decisions,294 (2) written, non-confidential opinions with 
 
 290. Supra note 253. 
 291. See supra Section IV.D (arguing that as contrasted with litigation, employment 
arbitration offers a more knowledgeable, cost-effective, and expeditious adjudication of a 
dispute. A complete ban on mandatory arbitration would not serve these interests well). 
 292. On December 6, 2017, after this note was drafted, Representative Cheri Bustos and 
Senator Kirsten Gillibrand introduced the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Harassment 
Act of 2017. S. 2203, 115th Cong. (2017-2018). Senate Bill 2203 states that “no predispute 
arbitration agreement shall be valid or enforceable if it requires arbitration of a sex 
discrimination dispute,” defined as “a dispute between an employer and employee arising out 
of conduct that would form the basis of a claim based on sex under Title VII.” Id. The bill is 
pending before the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee. Id. 
 293. In recent years, a number of bills have been introduced in Congress proposing to 
invalidate mandatory arbitration agreements to various extents - the most extreme blankly 
invalidating all mandatory arbitration clauses. Spitko, supra note 111, at 50, n.223. None of 
these bills has been politically viable. Id. at 50. 
 294. Currently, the grounds for judicial review of an arbitration award under the FAA are 
extremely limited. See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994) (permitting judicial review of any award procured 
by “corruption, fraud, or undue means,” arbitrator misconduct, or exceeded authority). 
Because arbitral proceedings are often slanted in favor of employers, judicial review is 
necessary to even out the imbalance for employees. See supra Section III.B.iii. In order for 
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reasons,295 (3) increased discovery, (4) access to information in choosing 
an arbitrator,296 (5) jointly and neutrally selected arbitrators who are 
trained and qualified,297 (6) cost of arbitration,298 and (7) non-waivable 
remedies.299  These procedural protections will address many of the 
concerns discussed in this comment while serving the best interests of 
all parties.  While organizations such as the AAA and JAMS already 
require many of these rules, not every employment contract is governed 
by these organizations and these rules are not binding law. 
Of course, the concern with such an amendment would be the 
power it gives States to regulate arbitration in favor of employees while 
ignoring the interests of employers.300  However, considering employers 
generally have the upper hand in employment disputes, this concern 
seems to pale in comparison to the current need for mandatory arbitration 
reform. 
With the ongoing #MeToo movement301 and media attention 
surrounding mandatory arbitration, now is the perfect time to lobby for 
change.  There is no quick fix.  This requires a cultural shift—it will take 
work in every industry, on all rungs of employment, everywhere.  
 
judicial review to exist, there must also be written records. See id. Increasing judicial review 
will also permit development of the law. See id.   
 295. This would allow arbitration participants, the EEOC, and Congress to study past 
decisions when choosing arbitrator, deciding to settle a case, and determining whether the law 
was correctly applied. See Sherwyn et al., Mandatory Arbitration, supra note 12, at 120. 
 296. The ability to choose an arbitrator is already part of most systems, but giving 
employees more information about arbitrators, particularly costs, histories, and past decisions 
(which would also require access to written decisions) would give employees the opportunity 
to choose an arbitral that is fairer. A roster of qualified arbitrators should be provided for 
employees to select from. 
 297. I suggest that arbitrators need knowledge of the statutory issues in the dispute. Some 
sort of formal training program should be implemented to ensure that arbitrators are qualified 
for their important role. 
 298. Placing the arbitral fee on the employer would make arbitral proceedings fairer as 
employees would not be required to pay for a judge in court. Lessening the financial burden 
for employees may increase the likelihood that an employee who has suffered from 
discrimination will bring a claim. An alternative to this would be cost-splitting, which would 
actually deal with the “repeat player” issue more effectively.   
 299. In Martens v. Smith Barney, the court held that arbitration agreements waiving the 
remedies of Title VII to be unenforceable, including attorney’s fees, monetary relief, and 
equitable remedies. 181 F.R.D. 243 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). While employers may not be as eager 
to enter arbitration if these remedies are available, the expediency of arbitration over litigation 
will nevertheless reduce employers’ overall costs and maintain arbitration as a desirable forum 
for employers. Id. 
 300. For a thorough discussion of this concern and another approach that deals with such 
concern, see Spitko, supra note 111, at 52. 
 301. The #MeToo movement has gained nationwide notoriety, building a community of 
survivors and bringing vital conversations about sexual violence into mainstream society. 
The movement seeks to de-stigmatize survivors by highlighting the breadth and impact 
sexual violence has on thousands of women. ME TOO, https://metoomvmt.org/ (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2017).   
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Individuals should continue to contact their state and federal 
representatives, initiate petitions, contact people running for elected 
positions, and voice their grievances.  The current movement has not 
gone unnoticed by political power figures.302   
While some states may be encouraged to change their arbitration 
proceedings, there will not be widespread reform of the arbitration 
system until a broad regulatory scheme is enacted for arbitration of Title 
VII (or other statutory) claims.  Congress or the Supreme Court must 
clarify the scope of the FAA, and then Congress must amend the FAA 
to set specific guidelines on how mandatory arbitration clauses may be 
written and how arbitration proceedings must be regulated.  A formal 
arbitral system controlled by law will increase the viability of arbitral 
forums for Title VII disputes and thereby reduce the risk of unfair 
arbitral proceedings. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Employers across the country utilize the arbitration system to 
resolve civil rights disputes.  Supreme Court jurisprudence in favor of 
mandatory arbitration enables large employers to force their employees 
into arbitration to resolve practically all types of claims.  Arbitration 
provides employees with a sure forum and an experienced decision 
maker.  Arbitration is also quicker and less expensive than litigation.  
These benefits, however, are currently outweighed by the need to 
provide substantive relief of statutory claims.  Mandatory arbitration 
clauses allow corporations to both write the rules that govern their 
contracts with workers and design the procedures used to interpret and 
apply these rules when disputes arise.  Without stricter regulation, 
mandatory arbitration leads to a greater imbalance in power between 
employers and employees, and its confidential nature deters from the 
preventative efforts of anti-harassment laws such as Title VII. 
The current mandatory arbitration system is ill-equipped to fairly 
settle civil rights claims and requires reform.  This is demonstrated by 
the failure of existing anti-discrimination laws to prevent rampant 
harassment in the workplace, such as in the Fox News example discussed 
above.  If employees are required to arbitrate Title VII claims, the 
procedures should include specific protections of their interests, 
preventing employers from taking advantage of the system.  To ensure 
 
 302. After Senate Bill 2203 was introduced all fifty state attorneys general threw their 
support behind the bill by writing a letter to both Senate and House Representatives asking, 
“for your support and leadership in enacting needed legislation to protect the victims of 
sexual harassment in the workplace.” Letter from Nat’l Ass’n of Attorneys General, to 
Congressional Leadership (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.manatt.com/Manatt/media/Documents/Articles/AGs-letter.pdf. 
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protection of employees’ substantive rights the system requires 
additional safeguards such as written public opinions, training programs 
for arbitrators, non-waivable remedies, and increased judicial review to 
ensure that the law is correctly interpreted and applied.  Congress must 
amend the FAA to give States more discretion to make these reforms in 
order to establish arbitration as a fair option for both employees and 
employers. 
Even if Congress were to implement these changes, arbitration 
would still serve its intended function of providing faster and less 
expensive relief.  If such protections existed and were enforced, perhaps 
harassment in the workplace would not run rampant and well-known 
men such as Harvey Weinstein would not get away with over thirty years 
of misconduct.  Adopting clear procedural protections and measures will 
lead to a fair arbitration system for the arbitration of Title VII disputes. 
 
